

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2		Page
3	I.	INTRODUCTION
4	II.	THE DEFAULT IS NOT VOID SINCE UOP RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE ACTION
5		BEFORE AN ANSWER WAS DUE
6	III.	THE COURT DOES NOT LACK JURISDICTION OVER UOP SINCE UOP WAS
7		PROPERLY SERVED AND THEREFORE COULD RESPOND BEFORE AN ANSWER
8		WAS DUE
9	IV.	UOP WAS A PART OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT4
10	V.	THE PLAINTIFF DID PLEAD SPECIFIC DAMAGES AND CAN BE AWARDED
11		PUNITIVE DAMAGES4
12	VI.	UOP SHOULD NOT BE RELIEVED FROM THE DEFAULT5
13	VII.	CONCLUSION
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES			
2	Page			
3	FEDERAL CASES			
4				
5	Espinoza v. United States, 52 F.3d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1995)			
6	FEDERAL RULES			
7				
8	Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure5			
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO THE UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, INC.'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT

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I.

INTRODUCTION

This case is quite simple. The Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with the University of Phoenix ("UOP") on July 19th, 2007. Prior to his termination, the Plaintiff informed the UOP management and the Apollo Group, Inc. Employee Relations Consultant April Alcorn that the San Diego Enrollment Department was in violation of the Higher Education Act, and allowed UOP and the Defendant April Alcorn a reasonable amount of time to cease and desist the company's illegal activity. Rather than amending their illegal activity, UOP and April Alcorn waited until the Plaintiff was on a suggested leave of absence, and knowingly terminated him without proper warning purposefully ignoring an email by the Plaintiff to the Defendants that stated the purpose of his brief ten day absence from the company and provided a personal contact email address should he need to be reached regarding any further developments in his original complaint filed with the company on June 11, 2007 (Please see Exhibit A, dated July 13th, 2007, an email sent by the Plaintiff to April Alcorn, Mechelle Bonilla, and Martin Espinoza which states, "As per our telephone conversation yesterday morning I understood that you would get back to me within twentyfour hours...this is a very serious issue to me and I am extremely stressed out...I appreciate the option of a leave of absence that you had offered me earlier this week...Hopefully upon my return you will have a resolution to my HR issues that I have previously presented to you. If you attain a resolution in the meantime feel free to send it to my personal email account: puddy29@aol.com". Please see Exhibit B, a letter from the Plaintiff to April Alcorn and other

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23 24 interested parties, dated June 11th, 2007, pages one through two, and subsequent Exhibits A1. B1, and C1, listing and supporting the Plaintiff's concerns with UOP, henceforth Apollo Group, Inc.'s negligent disregard and continued overt violation of the Higher Education Act. Please see Exhibit C, dated July 17th, 2007, a letter sent by Fed Express to the Plaintiff by April Alcorn, which states, "Our records indicate that you have not reported to work since Friday, July 13, 2007. Your failure to report to work has resulted in you being on an unauthorized leave of absence. Therefore, we expect you will return to work no later than Thursday, July 19, 2007 at your regularly scheduled work time. Failure to report to work by the designated date will leave us no other alternative but to accept your voluntary resignation." Please see Exhibit D dated July 19th, 2007, a letter sent by Fed Express to the Plaintiff by April Alcorn, which states, "Your failure to report to work has resulted in you being on an unauthorized leave of absence. A letter was sent to your home on July 17, 2007, expecting you to return to work no later than Thursday, July 19, 2007 at your regularly scheduled work time. You failed to report to work at the designated date and time. Consistent with our policy, the Company has chosen to separate your employment effective July 19, 2007." Please see Exhibit E, dated July 19th, 2007, a letter sent by Fed Express to the Plaintiff by April Alcorn, which states, "Thank you for bringing your workplace concerns to our attention. The Apollo Group, Inc. is committed to ensuring employees are treated fairly. Please be advised that the Apollo Group, Inc. has reviewed your concerns and we find no evidence to support any findings of the San Diego Enrollment Department violating Company policies or procedures as outlined by your allegations.")

Now the Defendant is alleging that she was never served properly, and so should not have to respond to the Plaintiff's complaint filed with the court on December 19th, 2007.

However, the Plaintiff, because Pro Se and to ensure service was proper, hired Mr. R.T. Hansell a professional service processor, who subcontracted service of process to Steve Ineich (Please see Exhibit F, a sworn affidavit of service by Steve Ineich, A.C.P.S. Process Server registered in Maricopa County, dated February 27th, 2008, and stating that he properly served the Defendant April Alcorn "by leaving ONE true copy(ies) of the above documents [SUMMONS, COMPLAINT & CONVER SHEET] with REBECCA SPRINGFIELD, SECURITY, AUTHORIZED. WORK: UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX Described as female. age 50, CAUC, 5ft. 7in. tall, 150 lbs., BROWN eyes, BLACK hair."). Despite the overwhelming evidence presented by the Plaintiff that service was proper upon all Defendant parties, Nathan Hicks of Snell and Wilmer L.L.P, who is representing all Defendant parties, even though each party falsely claim to be unrelated and unbeknownst of the other parties actions and policies, continues to allege that the Defendants should not be forced to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and respond to the Plaintiff's original complaint, thus requesting relief from the courts entry of default judgment against the defendants listed in this case. The Plaintiff moves the court to uphold its initial decision to enter a default judgment against the Defendant.

II.

THE COURT DOES NOT LACK JURISDICTION OVER APRIL ALCORN

Here, the Defendant April Alcorn alleges that "the Plaintiff did not serve Alcorn within the state. Alcorn did not consent to the Court's jurisdiction nor is she domiciled within California. Finally, Alcorn does not even come close to requiring the minimum contacts analysis required to demonstrate that the forum state has a sufficient relationship with her to make it reasonable to requires her to defend the current action in California...Accordingly, the

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Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Alcorn, and the entry of default against her is void and should be set aside." This is not true. As CALDER V. JONES, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) found...This minimum contact and malicious conduct by the Defendant April Alcorn is demonstrated in Exhibits A through E. Please also see Exhibit G, originally submitted as Exhibit H in the "PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S DOCUMENT ENTITLED: "APOLLO GROUP, INC.'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT" which demonstrates that the Defendant April Alcorn conducted daily business operations from her place of employment in Arizona listed with the company at 4615 E. Elwood St., Phoenix, AZ 85040 in direct conjunction with the San Diego Enrollment Departments located at 1230 Columbia St., San Diego, CA 92101 and 3890 Murphy Canyon Road, San Diego, CA 92123, Exhibit G is an email correspondence between the Plaintiff's former Enrollment manager at the University of Phoenix; Mechelle Bonilla and Apollo Group, Inc.'s Employee Relations Consultant April Alcorn, which states: "Hi April, I have approached Chad again today, June 7, 2007 to have him sign the final written warning, he has again refused to sign it. Kyan Flynn, my director will be at the campus later today to be of witness to his refusal...Please let me know how to handle the situation from this point forward. Thank you.")

The Plaintiff was unable to originally collect unemployment insurance in California due to a direct decision made by the Defendant April Alcorn made to terminate the Plaintiff's employment with the University of Phoenix from her office of employment in Arizona.

(Please see Exhibit H, dated the 16th of August, 2007, a letter from the Employment Development Department denying the Plaintiff's ability to collect unemployment insurance, page 1, paragraph 1, of the letter states, "You are not eligible to receive benefits under

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California unemployment insurance code section 1256 beginning 07/15/07...") The Plaintiff received unemployment benefits after the decision was overturned by the Honorable Catriona M. Miller, Administrative Law Judge. However, this was not until several months after the plaintiff had been fired from his job in California by April Alcorn in Arizona. (Please see Exhibit I, dated October 29, 2007, a letter from the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, page 3, paragraph 6, which states, "it is concluded that the claimant was discharged for reasons other than misconduct connected with the most recent work. Accordingly, he is not disqualified for benefits under code section 1256, and the employer's reserve account is subject to benefit charges."

III.

APRIL ALCORN WAS GIVEN SUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS

Here, the Defendant moves the Court set aside the Clerk's entry of default because the Plaintiff "did not properly serve Alcorn". This is not correct as is again demonstrated in Exhibit F, a sworn affidavit of service by Steve Ineich, A.C.P.S. Process Server registered in Maricopa County, dated February 27th, 2008, stating that he properly served the Defendant April Alcorn "by leaving ONE true copy(ies) of the above documents [SUMMONS, COMPLAINT & CONVER SHEET] with REBECCA SPRINGFIELD, SECURITY, AUTHORIZED. WORK: UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX Described as female, age 50, CAUC, 5ft. 7in. tall, 150 lbs., BROWN eyes, BLACK hair."

IV.

THE PLAINTIFF MAY BE AWARDED PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The Defendant claims in its "OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT" that "McKinney may not be awarded punitive damages without a hearing". Under § 1981, punitive damages may be awarded "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 , 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1628, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). To support a punitive damages award, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference to the plaintiff's federally protected rights. Reynolds v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 115 F.3d 860, 869 (11th Cir.1997). Malice means "an intent to harm" and recklessness means "serious disregard for the consequences of [one's] actions." Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc., 97 F.3d 488, 491 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). See also Walters, 803 F.2d at 1147 (defining the standard as "cynical disregard"). "[T]he imposition of punitive damages in civil rights actions has generally been limited to cases involving egregious conduct or a showing of willfulness or malice on the part of the defendant"); Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135, 1147 (11th Cir. 1986). The defendant's showing of malice is demonstrated by the manner in which the employee was fired (Please again refer to Exhibits A through E and G through I of the "PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO APRIL ALCORN'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT").

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V.

APRIL ALCORN SHOULD NOT BE RELIEVED FROM THE CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT

The Defendant alleges that "(1) the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Alcorn; (2) the summons was not properly directed to any entity or individual; (3) McKinney did not make any reasonable attempts at personal service; (4) McKinney did not mail a copy of the summons and Complaint to the Individual Defendant; and (4) [5] Alcorn was not made aware of her involvement in this action until McKinney mailed her a notice of default on March 26, 2008, there was no reason to believe that Alcorn had been given sufficient service of process..." The Defendant's justifications presented as reasons 1 through 5 have been demonstrated by the Plaintiff to be false and inaccurate (Please see Exhibits A through I), henceforth April Alcorn should not be relieved from the Clerk's entry of default.

Additionally, the Defendant pleads that it "was mistaken" that it had not been given actual notice. This is not a bona fide legal defense, such as hardship, or any other good or substantive reason allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Finally, although the Plaintiff believes that according to the law proper service was met, should the Court determine that service was not proper, the plaintiff hereby requests permission from the Court to amend the complaint based on Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure:

Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:

If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the

failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Under this rule, the court can employ a two-step analysis (*Espinoza v. United States*, 52 F.3d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1995). First, the plaintiff is entitled to a mandatory extension of time if the plaintiff demonstrates good cause for failing to timely effect service. Second, if the plaintiff fails to show good cause, the court may exercise its discretion and either dismiss the case without prejudice or extend the time for service. *Id.*; *see also* Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 advisory committee notes to the 1993 amendments to subdivision (m) ("The new subdivision . . . authorizes the court to relieve a plaintiff of the consequences of an application of this subdivision even if there is no good cause shown.").

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff moves the court to reject the motion because the Defendant did not show good or substantive cause or hardship or schedule conflicts or any other good reason as to why they could not respond to the original complaint within the allotted time according to the rules of the F.R.C.P. Wherefore the Plaintiff moves the court to reject the Defendant's motion and uphold its entry of default judgment against the Defendant.

Respectfully submitted,

Chad McKinne

Pro Se

6266 Madeline St 4pt #61 San Diego, CA 92115

San Diego, CA 92113

619-634-3566

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Chad McKinney, hereby certify that on, May 7, 2008, I served copies of the Plaintiff's Motions, Memorandums of Points and Authorities, and supporting Appendices to the Court on the following parties by way of United States Postal Service First Class Priority Mail:

Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. Attention of: Nathan W. Hicks 600 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1400. Costa Mesa, CA 92626

The United States District Court Southern District of California

Document 65-2

Filed 05/08/2008

Page 13 of 22

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Case 3:07-cv-02373-WQH-CAB

EXHIBIT A

Filed 05/08/2008

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DECLARATION OF R.T. HANSELL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

I, Bob Hansell, declare as follows:

- I am over the age of 18. I am currently employed as a County Process Server 1. at San Diego Service of Process, LLC in the city of San Diego. On January 31, 2008, I was, and currently am, bonded and registered in and for the County of San Diego.
- On the 31st of January, 2008, according to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2. 4(e)(1) I properly served Apollo Group, Inc., and the University of Phoenix.
- At the time of service, Ellen Bowens declared herself to be an Administrator 3. and the only person available. Ellen Bowens, who is actually an Operations Manager for the University of Phoenix, a wholly owned subsidiary of Apollo Group, Inc. refused to cooperate and produce the defendant employees for personal service, or any other person to accept for the defendant companies. Substitute service was then effected.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: March 24, 2008

R.T. Hansell, RPS #351

EXHIBIT B

Filed 05/08/2008

Page 18 of 22

△AO 440 (Rev. 10/93) Summons in a Civil Action

LIMITED	STATES	DISTRICT	COURT
CHALLERY	DIALES	DISTRUCT	COUNT

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN

District of

California

Chad McKinney, Pro Se

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL CASE

V

APOLLO GROUP INC., UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, a Corporation, MECHELLE BONILLA, an Enrollment Manager at UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, KYAN FLYNN, Director of Enrollment at UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, APRIL ALCORN, an Employee Relations Consultant at UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, CARLYN LINDSTEN. Associate Director of Enrollment at UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX

CASE NUMBER:

77 CV 2373 WOH CAB

TO: (Name and address of Defendant)

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to serve upon PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY (name and address)

Chad McKinney, Pro Se 6266 Madeline Street Apt. No. 61 San Diego, Ca 92115-5630

an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20 days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You must also file your answer with the Clerk of this Court within a reasonable period of time after service.

W. SAMUEL HAMRICK, JR.

MN 1 5 2008

CLERK

DATE

(By) DEPUTY CLERK

RETURN OF SERVICE				
Service of the Summons and Complaint was made by me	DATE 1/31/08			
NAME OF SERVER R.T. Hansell	TITLE R.P.S.			
Check one box below to indicate appropriate method of service				
Served personally upon the defendant. Place where served:				
Left copies thereof at the defendant's dwelling, house or use discretion then residing therein:	ual place of abode with a person of suitable age and			
Name of person with whom the summons and com	plaint were left:			
Return unexecuted: X Other (specify): Served Apollo Grove Copies with Ellen Bowe				
STATEMENT OF SERVI	CE FEES			
TRAVEL SER	VICES TOTAL \$ 45			
	of America that the foregoing information contained in			
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CONSENT TO TRIAL BY A UN	ITED STATES MAGISTRATE			
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISION OF 28 USC 636(C) YOU MAGISTRATE OF THIS DISTRICT MAY, UPON CONSENT OF ALL PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING A JURY OR NON-JURY TRIAL, AND COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF HAS RECEIVED A CONSENT FOR YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT YOUR DECISION TO CONSENT AND SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED SOLELY TO THE CLERK OF THE JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE TO WHOM THE CASE HAS BEEN A	PARTIES, CONDUCT ANY OR ALL ORDER THE ENTRY OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. M. OR NOT CONSENT IS ENTIRELY VOLUNTARY COURT, ONLY IF ALL PARTIES CONSENT WILL			
JUDGEMENTS OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATES ARE APPEALABLE TO ACCORDANCE WITH THIS STATUTE AND THE FEDERAL RULES	O THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS IN S OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.			

1) As to who may serve a summons see Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

EXHIBIT C

AO 440 (Rev. 10/93) Summons in a Civil Action

LIMITED	STATES	DISTRICT	COURT
	OTALEO	DISTRUCT	COUNT

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN

District of

California

Chad McKinney, Pro Se

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL CASE

V

APOLLO GROUP INC., UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, a Corporation, MECHELLE BONILLA, an Enrollment Manager at UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, KYAN PLYNN, Director of Enrollment at UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, APRIL ALCORN, an Employee Relations Consultant ut UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, CARLYN LINDSTEN, Associate Director of Enrollment at UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX

CASE NUMBER:

CAR

TO: (Name and address of Defendant)

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to serve upon PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY (name and address)

Chad McKinney, Pro Se 6266 Madeline Street Apt. No. 61 San Diego, Ca 92115-5630

an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20 days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You must also file your answer with the Clerk of this Court within a reasonable period of time after service.

SAMUEL HAMRICK, JR.

MAN 1 5 2008

CLERK

DATE

(By) DEPUTY CLERK

RETUR	N OF SE	RVICE			
Service of the Summons and Complaint was made by me	DATE	1/31/08			
NAME OF SERVER R.T. Hansell		TITLE	R. P.S.		
Check one box below to indicate appropriate method of serv	ice				
Served personally upon the defendant. Place		rved:	<u></u>		
Left copies thereof at the defendant's dwell discretion then residing therein: Name of person with whom the sure Return unexecuted: Other (specify): Served University Copies with Eller	mmons and	l complaint were lef	:		
	<u> </u>	RVICE FEES			
TRAVEL		SERVICES	TOTAL\$25		
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Service is true and correct. Executed on: Date Date					
				·	
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CONSENT TO TRIAL BY A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE					
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISION OF 28 US MAGISTRATE OF THIS DISTRICT MAY, UPON COMPROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING A JURY OR NON-JUR COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF HAS RECEIVED A YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT YOUR DECISION AND SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED SOLELY TO THE JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE TO WHOM THE CASE	Y TRIAL, CONSEN	AND ORDER THE FORM.	ENTRY OF A FINAL USENT IS ENTIRELY USENT IS ALL PARTIES	JUDGMENT. VOLUNTARY CONSENT WIL	
JUDGEMENTS OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATES ARE A ACCORDANCE WITH THIS STATUTE AND THE FE	DDCAI AP	LE TO THE U.S. C	OURT OF APPEALS		